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Explaining Serbia’s Decision to go to the ICJ 
 
James Ker-Lindsay 
London School of Economics 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, in February 2008, the Serbian 
Government initiated a range of steps to discourage international recognition of the new state. 
Perhaps the most controversial of these was the decision to seek an advisory opinion from the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). As will be seen, the move served both internal and 
external goals. Internally, it provided further evidence that firm measures were being taken to 
challenge Kosovo’s secession. Internationally, it was understood that even if the process did 
not result in an eventual legal victory that would force countries that had recognised Kosovo 
to reverse their decision, it would nevertheless serve to slow the pace of recognitions as many 
countries would wait for the Court’s decision. However, the decision to refer the matter to the 
Court also posed risks for Serbia. Most notably, it had the potential to disrupt relations with 
both the United States and key members of the European Union. As a result, Belgrade 
adopted a rather cautious approach when deciding on how to frame the question to be put 
before the Court. Despite this effort not to antagonise key states, there was initially strong 
opposition to the move by a number of EU members. But this proved to be short-lived after it 
became apparent that efforts to pressure Serbia to drop the case were sending out the wrong 
message to the wider international community. As a result, on 9 October 2008, the United 
Nations General Assembly passed a resolution referring the question of the legality of 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence to the ICJ. 
 
 
2. The Declaration of Independence and Serbia’s response 
 
By the middle of 2007 it was clear that Kosovo was preparing to declare independence. 
Although the Security Council had failed to reach an agreement on the Ahtisaari proposals, 
and a new process had been convened under the auspices of the Troika, few observers were 
left with any real doubts that the authorities in Pristina were determined to secede, with or 
without UN approval.
1
 This perception was further reinforced by the strong statements of 
support coming from key Western countries, such as the United States, in particular,
2
 as well 
as Britain, France, and, to a lesser extent at this stage, Germany. As a result, the Serbian 
Government was left with little choice but to begin to plan its strategy for the moment when 
the declaration of independence occurred. 
 
Although Belgrade was adamant from the outset that it would not resort to the threat or use of 
armed force to pursue its sovereignty over Kosovo,
3
 it nevertheless reserved the right to take 
all necessary legal, political and economic steps required to defend its claim to the province. 
All ministries were therefore asked to prepare proposals outlining the steps they could take to 
manage the situation.
4
 Within the Foreign Ministry a diplomatic campaign was designed to 
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prevent the recognition of Kosovo by other states and prevent it from joining various 
international organisations; an effort that would be overseen by the foreign minister, Vuk 
Jeremic.
5
 As part of this wider external effort to prevent Kosovo from being recognised and 
legitimised, in December 2007 President Boris Tadic raised the possibility that Serbia would 
even consider referring the question of Kosovo’s unilateral secession to the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).
6
 
 
Serbia was therefore well prepared for the unilateral declaration of independence when it 
finally came, on 18 February 2008. Days beforehand, the Serbian Parliament passed a 
resolution annulling the decision.
7
 This was followed by a decision to pursue treason charges 
against the president, prime minister and speaker of the parliament in Kosovo.
8
 Meanwhile, 
the campaign to prevent the international recognition of the new ‘Republic of Kosovo’ began 
in earnest.
9
 From the outset, it was obvious that in many cases such efforts were pointless. 
There was never any doubt that the United States and many EU members would quickly 
recognise the new state, and that they would strongly encourage others to do so. As a result, 
within the first six weeks after the declaration of independence, 35 countries had explicitly 
accepted the new state of affairs.
10
 However, Serbia was also able to claim some important 
victories. Most importantly, Russia issued a strongly worded statement condemning the 
declaration of independence, which it claimed violated, ‘the sovereignty of the Republic of 
Serbia, the Charter of the United Nations, UNSCR 1244, the principles of the Helsinki Final 
Act, Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework and the high-level Contact Group accords.’11 The 
Chinese Government also noted its grave concern over the move.
12
 The positions of Moscow 
and Beijing were crucial inasmuch as they signalled that Kosovo would be unable to join the 
United Nations; a key step in the overall process of legitimising Kosovo on the world stage. 
Meanwhile, many other counties also announced that they would not recognise Kosovo under 
the current circumstances. As well as emerging regional leaders, such as India and Brazil, the 
list of the stated ‘non-recognisers’ included several European Union members, notably 
Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.
13
 
 
In between the two opposing poles of opinion lay the majority of UN members. These were to 
become the ‘battleground states’.14 In some cases, resistance to recognizing Kosovo was 
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relatively strong, but far from insurmountable. While not wishing to antagonise any side, 
many countries harboured deep concerns about the implications of legitimising a unilateral 
act of secession. They might relent, but would have to be persuaded. In contrast, a number of 
other states appeared to be rather more willing to recognise, but did not want to be seen to 
rush into a decision for whatever reason. Without a good reason to resist, it seemed likely that 
many of these ‘undeclared’ states would eventually relent under the growing pressure being 
brought to bear on them by the United States, Britain and France – the three countries leading 
international efforts to secure recognitions.
15
 At the heart of their tactics to win over wavering 
states lay the argument that Kosovo was a unique case (‘sui generis’) in international politics. 
This was significant as it seemingly offered reassurance that the decision to recognise Kosovo 
would not have any spill over effects elsewhere.16 This in turn made the situation all the more 
difficult for Serbia as it provided a seemingly plausible cover for states if they did wish to join 
the ranks of the recognisers; even though many countries appeared to understand that the 
assertion that Kosovo was sui generis was essentially a political, and not a legal, claim.
17
 
 
Given this combination of strong diplomatic pressure and the ‘unique case’ argument, Serbia 
had little choice but to formulate a strategy that would challenge this argument head on before 
the ICJ. The difficulty facing the Serbian Government was that this was fraught with danger. 
While a decision by the Court in its favour could have a major positive effect, and might even 
result in some countries reversing their initial decision to recognise Kosovo,
18
 there was 
always the possibility that the ICJ could come down in favour of Kosovo. This would almost 
certainly open the flood gates to further recognitions. Ultimately, though, Belgrade had little 
choice but to pursue the ICJ option. By failing to act at all, it would not only allow the 
pressure on countries to recognise Kosovo to go unchecked, it could also send out the 
message that Serbia had either decided that it did not have a strong case, or that it was 
effectively signalling that it had given up on Kosovo. Balanced against this risk, however, 
Belgrade also realised that, regardless of the eventual outcome of the case, a referral to the 
Court would almost certainly deprive Kosovo of a lot of the recognition momentum it had 
established in the initial weeks after the declaration of independence. For as long as the 
question of Kosovo’s independence was before the Court, it would be perfectly reasonable for 
Serbia to ask states to defer their decision on recognition, despite the pressure that they were 
facing – a tactic that would in fact prove to be broadly successful.19 Regardless of the 
eventual outcome, the decision to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice 
therefore came to be seen as a cornerstone of Belgrade’s wider diplomatic strategy to prevent 
recognition. 
 
Simultaneously, the decision to pursue a case before the ICJ also played an important role in 
domestic Serbian politics. The declaration of independence had led to major demonstrations 
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in Serbia and there was still considerable public unhappiness at the way in which Serbia had 
been treated by the United States and the main EU members. By referring the matter to the 
Court, the government would buy valuable time at home to allow popular feeling to subside 
while still being able to claim that it had taken a decisive step to protect the country’s national 
interests. To this extent, the element of delay would prove to be a crucial factor underlying 
the decision from both a domestic and foreign policy angle.  
 
 
3. The decision to question recognition or secession 
 
Having decided on the importance of pursuing a case before the ICJ, Serbia now had to 
decide on the specific approach it wished to take. It faced several choices. One option was, 
however, always off the table. There was never any possibility of bringing a case against 
Kosovo directly. In part, this was because Kosovo was not a state party to the Statute of the 
Court. However, it was also understood that, ‘such action would represent a tacit 
acknowledgment of Kosovo’s statehood.’20 This left two other main options. On the one hand, 
Belgrade could challenge the legality of the decision by one or more states to recognise 
Kosovo in contentious proceedings. On the other, they could seek an advisory opinion on the 
legality of the declaration of independence itself. 
 
Assuming the Court eventually came down in Serbia’s favour, the first option was widely 
viewed as being much the better route. As far as Belgrade was concerned, the decision of 
states to recognise Kosovo amounted to a clear breach of international obligations to respect 
the territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia. Moreover, it was the best choice in terms of 
achieving the specific goal of forcing states that had recognised to reverse their decision and 
preventing further recognitions. But it also presented several major drawbacks. In the first 
instance, it was hardly practical to go against every state that had recognised Kosovo.
21
 Of 
course, Serbia could instead pursue a case against a small number of states. Here again, the 
options were limited. While the most obvious targets were the United States or the key EU 
members, a decision to focus on them would almost certainly have grave implications. While 
Belgrade may have been extremely unhappy at the way in which Washington had supported 
Kosovo’s secession, Serbian officials were nevertheless keen to ensure that the diplomatic 
fallout with Washington and the EU was minimised. The United States was seen as a crucial 
strategic and economic partner for Serbia. Any attempt to bring a case against the US would 
have seriously harmed bilateral relations. As for the EU members, there was a real possibility 
that the state in question would retaliate by blocking Serbia’s EU integration process. This 
would run counter to the explicitly stated policy of the Serbian Government to pursue the twin 
goals of ‘Kosovo and EU membership’. Certainly within the Democratic Party (DS) elements 
of the government, there was never any question of relinquishing EU accession for Kosovo 
(but, then again, neither vice versa).
22
  
 
Another option would have been to bring a case against a small non-EU country in the hope 
that if Serbia won it would then force the other countries to change their positions. But this 
too was impractical. For a start, such an approach would still have posed a challenge to the 
decisions taken by the US and the EU recognisers, inasmuch as a successful outcome for 
Serbia would have had an impact on their recognition decisions. It would also have damaged 
Serbia’s credibility more widely. There was a real chance that Belgrade would be seen as 
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being too cowardly to face the big powers and so had decided to bully a smaller state. This 
would be especially damaging for Serbia given that much of its counter recognition activity 
was now aimed at trying to win support from various African, Asian and Latin American 
states. It could not afford to alienate this group. 
 
Therefore, while the option of challenging the decision of one or more countries to recognise 
Kosovo was favoured by many in Serbia, most notably the caretaker prime minister, Vojislav 
Koštunica,23 it was deemed to be too politically costly by both the president and the foreign 
minister; who were ultimately the key decision makers on this issue.
24
 As a result, Serbia 
decided against any direct challenge to the decision of states to recognise Kosovo. This in 
turn meant that Serbia now had only one other route. If Belgrade was not going to pursue a 
contentious case against a state directly, it had no alternative but to seek an advisory opinion 
on some aspect of the legality of Kosovo’s secession.  
 
 
4. International opposition to the case 
 
On 26 March 2008, the Serbian Government announced that it would pursue an advisory 
opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence.25 As the ICJ could only 
issue an advisory opinion if asked to do so by the Security Council or the General 
Assembly,
26
 or by an organ authorised to do so by the General Assembly,
27
 attention now 
turned to securing a General Assembly resolution referring the matter to the Court.
28
  
 
Despite the fact that Belgrade had chosen to pursue a less confrontational route, the 
announcement by the Serbian Government that it intended to secure a General Assembly 
resolution bringing matter before the International Court of Justice nevertheless brought about 
a strongly negative reaction from a number of countries. The United States immediately made 
it clear that it felt that the move was not only unhelpful, but would have little practical effect. 
Washington insisted that even if the case were to be brought to the Court, and the judges 
issued an opinion against Kosovo, it would have no effect on its decision to recognize 
Kosovo. As far as the US government was concerned, and in line with its long held policy, 
recognition remained a sovereign political decision. Within the European Union, the position 
was a little less certain. For a start, there was a much greater reluctance to dismiss any 
outcome of the Court. When pressed on the point, British officials, for example, refused to be 
drawn on whether they would be as willing as the United States to disregard an advisory 
opinion of the ICJ. To this extent, several of the key EU members that had recognised 
Kosovo, most notably Britain and France, decided that a more worthwhile approach to the 
matter would be to try to persuade Serbia to change its mind. To this extent, several senior 
officials made it clear that Belgrade’s decision to proceed with the application for an advisory 
opinion could have a very harmful effect on its quest for EU accession. Indeed, it was even 
suggested that it could bring the process to a halt entirely.
29
 
 
The problem for the European Union was that its attempts to dissuade Serbia from pursuing 
the case had the potential to put it in a very difficult position on the international stage. For a 
start, and most obviously, by trying to stop Serbia from going to the ICJ it would rather 
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suggest that members actually harboured real doubts over the legality of their decision to 
recognise Kosovo. If they were so sure about the validity of their decision, as many states 
were publicly insisting, then surely they would have little to fear if it went before the ICJ. Of 
course, it was not as simple as this. A decision could turn against either side, no matter how 
watertight they felt their arguments were. Nevertheless, by being seen to be opposing an 
advisory opinion, there was a real danger that this would inevitably be read as a sign of the 
intrinsic weakness of their case, which might well have deterred some of those countries from 
sitting on the fence from recognising Kosovo. Secondly, when looked at from a wider 
perspective, at a time when EU members were attempting to emphasise the importance of 
international law in global politics, and were seeking to strengthen the institutions of 
international justice, it would have sent out the message that they are unwilling to subject they 
own actions to legal oversight. They would run the risk of being accused of double standards. 
This accusation of double standards would have been especially strong in the case of Serbia. 
Having taking an uncompromising stand on Belgrade’s full cooperation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a precondition for membership of the 
Union, it would not look good for EU members to demand that their own actions be exempt 
from legal scrutiny on the grounds of political expediency. Finally, it would have had 
possibly unwelcome implications for the EU’s ability to handle peace and security in South 
East Europe. After insisting that the states of the Western Balkans must not resort to armed 
force in managing their disputes, and having explicitly warned Serbia not to do so in the case 
of Kosovo, it would have been illogical, if not fundamentally wrong, to try to close off the 
most peaceful and legitimate methods of conflict resolution. 
 
Therefore, while the United States remained adamantly opposed to any effort to bring the 
matter before the ICJ, for the reasons stated above, the European Union soon realised that it 
would be counter-productive to issue any further threats against Serbia or otherwise try to 
pressure Belgrade to desist from seeking an advisory opinion.  
 
 
5. The UN General Assembly Resolution 
 
Once Serbia had opted to pursue the advisory opinion route, it needed to decide the exact 
question to be put to the Court. Once again, there were several options available. These 
essentially broke down into two categories. Belgrade could either question the legality of the 
declaration of independence or it could ask whether the declaration of Kosovo had brought 
into effect a new state. The latter question was perhaps the more risky inasmuch as it would 
force the Court to take a very clear stand on the actual status of Kosovo as a political entity. If 
the Court found in Kosovo’s favour, then the way would be open for widespread recognition 
to follow. The former question, on the legality of the declaration of independence, therefore 
seemed less risky. But even then, there were further decisions to be made about the exact 
question to be asked. On the one hand, a very specific question could be formulated that 
closely matched the one put to the Canadian Supreme Court over Quebec.
30
 Again, this would 
offer a much greater chance of a clear outcome. The problem is that this outcome could go 
against Serbia, in which case Belgrade’s room for manoeuvre would be severely curtailed. In 
contrast, a far more ambiguous question would offer plenty of room for the judges to offer a 
less precise answer, thereby make it less likely that Serbia would find itself trapped by a 
wholly unfavourable decision. In the end, the Serbian Government decided against a highly 
specific question. On 15 August 2008, the Serbian Government unveiled the text of the 
proposed resolution. The exact question to be addressed to the Court was as follows: ‘Is the 
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 ‘Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to 
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unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of 
Kosovo in accordance with international law?’ 
 
In the weeks that followed, a vigorous diplomatic campaign took place as the various parties 
tried to lobby countries to vote in their favour. In an attempt to build support for its position, 
Serbian officials held over 50 bilateral meetings with foreign officials.
31
 In doing so, it sought 
to emphasise the dangers of the Kosovo precedent and allowing it to go unchallenged. For 
example, following a meeting with the UN Secretary-General, Tadić stated, ‘to vote against 
means to accept that nothing could be done when secessionists in whichever part of the world 
proclaim the uniqueness of their cause, and claim exception to the universal scope of 
international law.’32 Meanwhile, the United States actively encouraged countries to vote 
against the draft resolution. However, the European Union decided not to follow the US 
position. Having so openly supported the ICJ, and international law, as a mechanism for 
resolving conflict, the EU could not be seen to be voting against an effort to bring a matter 
that they were closely involved with before the Court. Nor could EU members be seen to be 
trying to persuade others to vote against the resolution. For this reason, it was agreed that 
those EU members that did not plan to vote in favour of the resolution, notably the members 
that had not recognised Kosovo, should instead abstain. 
 
In the weeks that followed, many other states also chose to take the same position as the 
European Union. As a result, by the day of the vote, 8 October 2008, it was widely 
understood that there was likely to be few votes cast against the resolution. Along with the 
EU members, most of the other recognising states, which by this point lay at 47 countries, 
approximately a quarter of the UN, had also opted either to abstain or not to participate at all. 
Meanwhile, Serbia had managed to muster up considerable support for its case. In addition to 
Russia and China and the EU states that had chosen not to recognise Kosovo, it also managed 
to gather support from a number of other countries, including at least one recognising state – 
Norway.
33
 Nevertheless, the vote was preceded by a strong debate. For example, the US 
deputy permanent representative to the UN insisted that Kosovo’s independence was in 
accordance with international law and that the resolution was ‘unnecessary and unhelpful’.34 
Meanwhile, the British Permanent Representative to the UN, Sir John Sawers, accused Serbia 
of pursuing the case, ‘primarily for political rather than legal reasons.’35 
 
In the end, 77 countries voted in favour of the resolution.
36
 As well as Russia, China and the 
remaining 5 non-recognising EU members,
37
 the resolution was supported by Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, Nigeria and South Africa. In contrast, just six countries voted against the 
resolution: the United States, Albania and four Pacific island states. 74 states, including all the 
members of the European Union that had by this point recognised Kosovo, abstained. The 
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remaining 34 members – including Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina – decided not to 
participate in the vote at all.
38
 
 
In Serbia, there was jubilation at the decision. The result was hailed by Serbian Prime 
Minister Mirko Cvetković as ‘a big success’.39 The next day, the Secretary General, Ban Ki-
Moon, officially conveyed the request of the General Assembly to the International Court of 
Justice confirming that under Article 65, Paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court the UN 
Secretariat was preparing a dossier for the Court containing all relevant documents and that 
this would be transmitted ‘as soon as possible.’40 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In examining Serbia’s decision to refer the matter to the ICJ, it is evident that this had always 
been viewed as a potential element of a wider counter-secession strategy. This was openly 
stated even before Kosovo declared independence. Nevertheless, relatively quickly it also 
became an act of necessity. Quite apart from the fact that Belgrade had to show that it was 
doing everything in its power to maintain a claim to Kosovo, it was obvious that it did not 
have the political and diplomatic strength to counter a concerted campaign by a number of 
major international states, most notably the United States and key members of the European 
Union, to press for Kosovo’s recognition on the international stage. Faced with a strong 
campaign to persuade countries that Kosovo was a unique case in international politics, 
Serbia had little choice but use international law to challenge this argument. Meanwhile, the 
decision to pursue a case before the ICJ was also crucial as a delaying tactic. It was important 
that Serbia slow down the pace of recognitions after the initial flurry that occurred in the 
immediate weeks following the declaration of independence. By taking the matter before the 
Court, regardless of the eventual outcome, Serbia gave countries a legitimate reason to resist 
external pressure to recognise Kosovo. Simultaneously, at the domestic level, the decision to 
take the matter before the ICJ was not only tangible proof that the government was fighting 
the Kosovo cause as best it could, it also provided a very welcome way of letting the 
significant tensions that had emerged from within society over Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence, and Western support for the move, subside. Bearing this in mind, and 
regardless of the eventual outcome of the case, the strategy of pursuing a case before the ICJ 
should be broadly regarded as having been successful in at least two senses. The pace of 
recognitions did slow, as acknowledged by Kosovo itself, and public anger did diminish.  
 
Having opted to pursue the ICJ route, Belgrade proved to be exceedingly cautious in how it 
pursued the matter from there. It avoided steps that could be seen to be overtly 
confrontational towards either the United States or the key sponsors of Kosovo’s 
independence within the European Union. In line with Belgrade’s openly stated policy of 
‘both Kosovo and the European Union’, the Serbian Government ensured that in taking a 
course of action that was unpopular amongst the main EU members, it did not unduly 
antagonise them. This explains why it avoided the route that many thought offered the 
greatest potential for victory: questioning the decision of states to recognise Kosovo. Instead 
chose to call into question the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence in advisory 
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 Request for an Advisory Opinion transmitted to the Court pursuant to General Assembly resolution 
NRES/63/3 (A/63/L.2) of 8 October 2008 
proceedings. While this is understandable, what is less easy to explain is the reasoning behind 
the decision to ask a question that focused on the legality of the declaration of independence, 
rather than focus on another legal aspect of the situation, such as Kosovo’s claim to statehood. 
In part, it could perhaps be explained as part of a policy of potential loss minimisation. If a 
very precise question had been asked that gave the Court little room more manoeuvre, it is 
possible that it would have come down against Belgrade. Serbia would have faced an all or 
nothing outcome. But even if it won, it would be a Pyrrhic victory. It would still be left in a 
situation whereby its close allies in the EU would have been painted into a corner. Told that 
Kosovo’s secession was illegal, they would have faced the uncomfortable and potential 
destabilising prospect of having to reopen status talks. In such a situation, EU members may 
have taken an even more uncompromising position regarding Serbia; effectively demanding 
that either Belgrade accept Kosovo’s independence or accept the end of its EU accession 
prospects. To this end, and somewhat paradoxically, a victory before the ICJ would almost 
certainly have forced Serbia into a situation where it would have to accept Kosovo’s 
independence. In contrast, a question that allowed for a more ambiguous result could, and 
indeed eventually did, provide for a result that would allow everyone to claim victory, or at 
least avoid being seen as having lost.
41
 
 
This leads to a final question: why did Serbia not cave in to the pressure from lead members 
of the European Union to drop the case altogether? In part, this is perhaps tied to the relative 
speed with which the calls for it to do so subsided. One can only guess whether Belgrade 
would have eventually relented had the European Union members maintained their threats to 
block Serbia’s EU course if it pursued the case. As a counterfactual it is an interesting 
question, and one that is hard to answer. On the one hand, the way in which Serbia eventually 
relented on a further resolution calling for more status talks at the end of the ICJ opinion, in 
2010, would suggest that it may have done so. However, given that this took place at a very 
early stage, when Serbia was fighting particularly hard to prevent recognition, and public 
emotions were still riding high, suggests that it might not have been willing, or politically 
able, to reverse course; even if key members demanded it. In the event, Serbia was saved 
from having to make this decision by the fact that the European Union had no choice but to 
relent and allow the vote for fear of undermining its credibility as a key voice on the 
international stage for the international rule of law and respect for international institutions. 
Having set in motion a process that the leading members of the European Union evidently 
opposed, Serbia was eventually saved by the fact that the decision to pursue a case before the 
ICJ was in fact in accordance with certain key principles that the EU has sought to encourage 
others to follow. Even though this may have been more by accident than design, Belgrade put 
the EU in the uncomfortable position of being open to claims of double standards. In doing 
so, it was able to win a major victory by securing a General Assembly resolution referring 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence to the International Court of Justice.  
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